Toward a Switchover of Locomotives in the Global Economy by Canuto, Otaviano
1  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK  	 	 www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
SEPTEMBER 2010 • Number 33
1 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise








Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation  of  manufacturing  into  highly  integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing  of  some  of  the  conventional  wisdom  regarding  the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
The global economic crisis has forced a major rethinking of the respective roles of governments and markets in the
processes of trade and growth. Indeed, industrial policy seems to be back in fashion—or, at least, talking about it is.
But a renewed “activism” by government in the trade and growth agenda need not mean a return to old-style
policies of import substitution and “picking winners.” Instead, it may mean a stronger focus on competitiveness by
unlocking the constraints to private sector–led growth. This note discusses the renewed role of government in trade
and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.
Toward a Switchover of Locomotives in the Global Economy
Otaviano Canuto
The recovery in advanced economies is now exhibiting several signs of fragility and the medium-term growth prospects for 
these economies also look difficult. Could developing economies “switch over” to become locomotives in the global economy, 
providing a countervailing force against downward trends? The view taken here says, yes, as long as appropriate domestic 
policies and reforms are pursued in developing countries. 
Developing countries as a whole have been growing faster than 
advanced economies, even before the start of the current global 
economic crisis. In 2007 and the first three quarters of 2008, 
as the signs of increasing financial fragility and economic stag-
nation in the major advanced economies were becoming clear, 
much was said about a possible “decoupling” of emerging mar-
kets. This was just as promptly followed by talks of a downward 
“reverse coupling,” when these emerging markets and other de-
veloping economies were also impacted by the near collapse of 
finance and international trade during the last quarter of 2008 
and in early 2009.
Developing countries as a group have also been recovering 
faster than advanced economies, while also maintaining the 
positive growth premium that emerged prior to the global fi-
nancial crisis (figure 1). Indeed, growth in developing countries 
is projected by the World Bank to reach 6.0 percent in 2010 
and 5.9 percent in 2011, while corresponding figures are 2.2 
percent and 2.4 percent for high-income countries. Almost 
half of global gross domestic product (GDP) growth is current-
ly coming from developing countries. 
The current recovery in advanced economies is now exhib-
iting several signs of fragility and the medium-term growth 
prospects for these economies also looks difficult. In this envi-
ronment, two questions arise: Will developing economies expe-
rience a renewed downward “recoupling” as a result of a low-
growth scenario in advanced economies? Or, on the contrary, 
could developing countries “switch over” to become locomo-
tives in the global economy, providing a countervailing force 
against a slowing-down train?
In the view presented in this note, there is indeed a scope for 
a switchover where developing countries as a whole take on a 
greater role as a global locomotive and move global growth for-
ward, offsetting those forces moving toward a negative recou-
pling, which are derived from less buoyancy in the advanced 
countries. Nevertheless, a comprehensive homework in terms 
of domestic policies and reforms will be fundamental to ac-
complishing that mission.1
Legacy of the Global Financial Crisis on the 
Growth T rends of Advanced Economies 
High-income  countries  are  facing  strong  headwinds  in  the 
wake of the global financial crisis. It is still an open bet as to 
whether the promptness and strength of recovery in private ab-
sorption (consumption and investment) will be sufficient to 
render unnecessary the current life support provided by aggres-
sive monetary and fiscal policies, before their unwinding of this 
support becomes inevitable. If postwar recessions in Organisa-
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countries serve as a template, the switchover from public to pri-
vate sectors will not be automatic, because recessions associated 
with credit crunches, house price busts, or equity price busts 
tend to be both deeper and longer than typical recessions. In 
fact, very few OECD recessions in the postwar period—4 out of 
122—have occurred with a credit crunch, a housing bust, and 
an equity bust: the present crisis combines all three, and in a 
severe form (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2008).
Several factors point to a reduction of actual and potential 
growth in the medium term. First, at some point, fiscal consoli-
dation will become a major issue among advanced economies 
once—or even before—recovery is fully established. Many ad-
vanced economies entered the crisis with weak structural fiscal 
positions, and these have been eroded further, not only by anti-
crisis  measures,  but  also  by  underlying  spending  pressures. 
Structural primary deficits in advanced countries are expected 
to have worsened by 4 percentage points of GDP between 2007 
and 2010.  
Even with the reversal of temporary anticrisis measures, 
public debt in advanced G-202 economies is expected to reach 
118 percent of GDP by 2014 (figure 2). According 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “simply 
letting the stimulus expire would still leave the gov-
ernment debt of many advanced countries on an ex-
plosive path” (IMF 2009). Stabilizing debt at postcri-
sis  levels  will  also  not  be  enough  because  it  will 
reduce the ability of fiscal policy to deal with future 
shocks  and  will  push  postcrisis  real  interest  rates 
much higher.
On average, according to the IMF, bringing gov-
ernment debt-to-GDP ratios in advanced economies 
to a prudent level below 60 percent by 2030 would 
require steadily raising the structural primary bal-
ance from a deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP in 2010 to 
a surplus of 4.5 percent of GDP in 2020—an 8 per-
centage point swing in one decade—and keeping it at 
that level for the following decade. 
Thus, even considering that different features of 
national fiscal packages will have corresponding dif-
ferent consequences in terms of long-term growth 
Figure 1. World Output Growth, 1961–2012
Source:World Bank WDI and DEC Interim Forecasts April 2010.
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drivers, some future fiscal contraction negatively affecting the 
private sector will be the price paid for the role of fiscal stimu-
lus in rescuing advanced economies from the brink of the 
abyss during the crisis. And even if monetary policy maintains 
its current accommodative stances for some time and manages 
to sustain basic short-term interest rates at low levels, the yield 
curve on public debt may still steepen. 
Secondly, the deleveraging and adjustment of U.S. house-
holds’ balance sheets are far from complete. Consumption 
spending growth is likely to remain weak and/or wobbly in the 
absence of large, renewed hikes in asset prices. In the past, 
strong U.S. consumer spending was buttressed by rising hous-
ing prices, allowing rising household debt and reduced per-
sonal savings (figure 3). Lower savings were reflected in a rising 
U.S. current account deficit, a major source of U.S. domestic 
demand and of export demand for the rest of the world. Now, 
as housing and other household assets prices have fallen sub-
stantially, deeply indebted households are unlikely to under-
take a new spending spree any time soon. Rebuilding house-
hold balance sheets will be a lengthy process. 
A third aspect to weigh against a return to a high-growth 
path is the likely jobless nature of the current recovery in many 
high-income countries. Slow-to-reverse shocks—a financial cri-
sis combined with a housing price bust and cross-sector differ-
entiated job creation/destruction—have been in play and con-
tinued macroeconomic uncertainty is countering employment 
growth (IMF 2010, ch.3). The share of temporary workers has 
been on the rise in most advanced economies for years, reflect-
ing institutional changes in labor markets. But recent crisis-re-
lated increases in temporary employment will tend to have a 
limited effect in enhancing expenditures, while uncertainty 
regarding macroeconomic and sectoral prospects remains high.    
Fourth, all financial sector reregulation proposals under dis-
cussion point to higher costs of financial intermediation. After 
all, the general purpose is to curb the unbridled “endogenous 
liquidity factories” and the excessive leverage that led to wide-
spread asset bubbles in the run up to the economic crisis.
Recoupling or Switchover
The  recent  improved  growth  performance  in  developing 
countries is not just a reflection of strong performance by the 
two largest developing countries, China and India. Figure 4 
shows  the  frequency  distributions  of  individual  country 
growth rates in 2009, the expected trough of the crisis. Medi-
an growth in developing countries was substantially higher 
(2.13 percent) than in advanced economies (-3.72 percent). 
And a much larger proportion of developing countries have 
continued to enjoy positive growth than among advanced or 
high-income countries. 
Most of the developing countries situated at the right side 
tail of their distribution benefited from better macroeconom-
ic, structural, and other policies adopted over the last couple of 
decades. They had the capacity to resort to fiscal, monetary 
and financial countercyclical policies, as well as the ability to 
use foreign exchange reserves and exchange rate fluctuations as 
elements of their responses to the shock. On the left side of the 
distribution are countries that had combined financing via 
“bubbles” in high-risk lending in advanced economies with 
shaky domestic growth foundations—as in several Eastern Eu-
ropean and Central Asian countries. There are also some cases 
in which trade and financial integration led to severe impacts—
such as in Mexico and some Central American and Caribbean 
countries. In any case, the performance of developing coun-
tries  overall  has  been  high,  before 
and during the crisis, mostly reflect-
ing an improvement in the quality of 
the economic policies in the previous 
decade or so.
As one can see in figure 1, there 
has long been a close correlation be-
tween economic cycles in advanced 
and developing economies. But look-
ing only at global aggregates may ob-
scure an emerging story about trend 
decoupling  between  advanced  and 
developing countries. Since the early 
2000s,  the  cyclical  synchrony  has 
been  combined  with  systematically 
higher  growth  rates  in  developing 
relative  to  advanced  economies. 
While  before  the  early  2000s  the 
trend growth in developing countries 
was close to that in advanced coun-
tries, since then it has become sub-
Figure 3. United States: Personal Savings Rate and Current Account Balance, 1960–2009
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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stantially higher: a cyclical coupling has arguably continued as 
in the past, along with some trend decoupling in underlying 
rates of growth.
Three questions then arise:  
1.  How sustainable is the trend decoupling exhibited by de-
veloping countries in figure 1? 
2.  How high can actual and potential growth rates of develop-
ing countries remain as advanced economies continue to 
face recovery challenges? 
3.  To what extent can a high-growth performance by develop-
ing countries provide a positive feedback loop for advanced 
economies, helping to avoid a situation where even though 
developing  countries  continue  to  grow  faster  than  ad-
vanced economies, both grow at relatively low rates?   
Figure 5 provides a simplified illustration on the growth 
interdependence  between  the  two  groups  of  economies. 
Channels for growth interdependence may be interpreted as 
trade and corresponding investment prospects, as well as fac-
tor incomes abroad (return on foreign assets, remittances). 
The steepness of the lines for advanced countries (AC) re-
flects the up until now smaller weight of developing coun-
tries (DC) for their performance, whereas the greater sensi-
tivity of DC to variations in AC growth rates is expressed in 
the slopes of its corresponding lines. The legacy of the crisis 
on AC is shown by the shift from AC0 to AC1. The adverse 
impact of slower advanced country growth on developing 
countries—which we call the negative recoupling of develop-
ing countries—is reflected in a global move from point A to 
point  B.  However,  if  new  autonomous  sources  of  trend 
growth in DC—growth that does not depend directly on 
growth  in  advanced  economies—can  be  tapped  and  DC0 
shifts to DC1, then the global economy can settle at point C. 
Here, not only can developing countries escape from the 
negative recoupling, but there can 
also be a switchover, where develop-
ing  countries  become  the  global 
growth  locomotives  and  partially 
rescue advanced economies.
Developing economies as a whole 
do not yet have a size big enough to 
rescue the entire world economy from 
the  scenario  of  low  growth  in  ad-
vanced economies. In terms of levels, 
the size of G-73 economies at market 
prices is still 60 percent of world GDP, 
and the major potential new poles of 
growth  (China,  India,  and  Brazil) 
might account for up to 30 percent.  
As time passes by, however, the ab-
solute size of the two groups of coun-
tries is poised to reverse positions be-
cause the growth premium exhibited by developing countries 
since 2000 is expected to remain (figure 1). Recent IMF fore-
casts for global GDP with purchasing power parity (PPP)–ad-
justed exchange rates indicate developing countries as a group as 
bypassing advanced economies before 2015. Although develop-
Figure 4. Frequency Distribution of GDP Growth in 2009: Developed and Developing Countries
Source: World Bank.
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ing Asia has the lead in that dynamic, rising shares in global 
GDP are also a feature of other regions. Therefore, if new, au-
tonomous sources of trend growth in developing economies can 
be tapped, then not only can developing countries escape from 
a negative recoupling, but there can also be a switchover, where 
developing  countries  become  the  global  growth  locomotives 
and partially rescue advanced economies, thereby helping lift all 
economies.
The good news is that some possible sources of autonomous 
growth in developing countries can be found. However, tap-
ping into those sources will depend on the ability of developing 
countries to implement appropriate policies: let us see why.
Autonomous Sources of Potential Growth in   
Developing Countries and Their Challenges 
First, the fast recovery in many emerging markets has reflected 
the  good  shape  and  sustainability  of  their  national  balance 
sheets—as illustrated for the public sector in figure 2. Looking 
forward, there is in principle a wide range of greenfield invest-
ment opportunities in developing economies that may benefit 
from higher financial leverage by both public and private sec-
tors. Take the obvious example of infrastructure: given its rela-
tive scarcity, social marginal returns as measured in terms of 
total factor productivity tend to be high in projects that address 
the many existing bottlenecks. If projects are well designed, the 
partial monetary capture of those returns by either public or 
private sector entities may well constitute feasible vehicles for 
asset creation and finance.
Nonetheless, public sector management capacities and ap-
propriate governance mechanisms must be in place to guaran-
tee the use of adequate criteria in project choices and designs, as 
well as to avoid misappropriation of returns. Furthermore, eu-
phoria with recent macroeconomic successes must not lead to 
a careless walk on the slippery slope of increasing leverage. The 
current surge in private capital flows to emerging markets with 
a profile potentially conducive to fostering asset market bub-
bles, rather than to building greenfield assets, is a potential pit-
fall and must be countered with careful financial monitoring 
and regulation.
A second potential source of autonomous growth comes 
from  technology.  Developing  countries  face  a  technological 
convergence gap relative to the frontier level of knowledge in 
advanced economies in the majority of economic activities. Un-
exploited latecomer advantages are a venue for local productiv-
ity improvements, through technology transfer and adaptation, 
that remains open, even if the advance of technology slows 
down in high-income countries. Global changes in recent years 
have been making technological transfer easier than before, 
such as through: increased international trade in goods and ser-
vices; foreign direct investment; intellectual property and tech-
nology licensing flows; increases in data storage and transmis-
sion capabilities; and falls in costs and uptake of information 
and  communication  technologies  (Canuto,  Dutz,  and  Reis 
2010).
But again, policy challenges will have to be faced. Comple-
mentary factors such as reliable infrastructure, access to fi-
nance, and an educated labor force are inadequate and must be 
gradually  improved.  Furthermore,  institutional  factors  that 
negatively affect the investment climate tend to harm invest-
ments in technology and must be addressed.
Thirdly, provided that domestic absorption—public and pri-
vate consumption and investment—in developing countries as a 
whole rises relative to its own production potential, and South-
South trade openness is reinforced, there might be a new round 
of successful experiences of structural change and export-led 
growth. After World War II, Europe and Japan sustained a long 
growth cycle through a process of technological and mass con-
sumption catch-up with the United States. Whereas from the 
1990s  onward,  many  developing  economies  achieved  high 
growth facilitated through innovation in information and com-
munication technologies and globalization, but left an impor-
tant role to developed countries for absorption of their output. 
The time may now have come for better matching of increases 
in production and consumption within developing countries 
as a group, with South-South trade allowing small developing 
countries to also benefit (Canuto, Haddad, and Hansen 2010). 
The extraordinary growth performance of some Asian econ-
omies and China in particular—like the previous long periods 
of growth in Latin America—cannot be fully understood with-
out taking into account that to a large extent they experienced 
a peculiar process of structural change (at least at the start of 
the growth period): the dislocation of large contingents of low-
skilled workers from stagnant and low-productivity activities—
such as subsistence production in many rural areas—to other 
activities whose value at world prices is significantly higher and 
where there also exists a wide scope for productivity increases, 
a move generally accomplished without the need for major in-
creases in worker skills.
Rising  international  trade  and  the  technological  changes 
have made such structural change easier. Among technology 
trends, the standardization, modularization, and codification 
of technologies, especially in the electronics and auto industries 
and in some services, have made it easier to deverticalize and off 
shore production (Yusuf 2009; Ghani and Kharas 2010). With 
fragmentation of production and trade in tasks, as well as de-
creasing costs of transport and communication, the barriers to 
structural change have become relatively easier to surmount. 
Local market size has become less of a constraint on scale and 
scope, while learning spillovers and coordination needs may be 
found through integration in cross-border networks of produc-
tion. Local institutional requirements remain, however.  
To take additional steps up the ladder of technological so-
phistication, moving beyond early, easy production of tradable 
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some capabilities that transcend particular existing lines of pro-
duction at a given moment in time: this requires the ability to 
learn, master, and adapt technologies in a creative way; to man-
age complex processes of design, production, and marketing; 
and more. Again, recent trade and technology trends have been 
favorable to latecomers from a cost-competitiveness standpoint, 
as long as the abovementioned domestic complementary factors 
necessary for creative technology absorption are in place. 
In developing countries, programs investing in infrastruc-
ture, human capital, poverty reduction, and social inclusion 
would stimulate local consumption and investment, producing 
positive feedback loops. A higher role for effective networks of 
social protection and for active poverty reduction policies in 
developing countries may therefore become a component of 
sustainable global growth.
Finally, natural-resource intensive developing countries may 
benefit from the fact that the relative demand for commodities 
tends to remain strong in the medium term, to the extent that 
world growth after the crisis will be more dependent on devel-
oping countries as a group and demand in these countries is 
more commodity intensive than elsewhere (Brahmbhatt and 
Canuto 2010). Once again, quality of policies in developing 
countries will determine whether that may become either a 
blessing or a curse: there is much that countries can do to ensure 
that natural resources provide a foundation for a broadly based 
and increasingly diversified economic growth strategy. As long 
as appropriate governance and revenue administration mecha-
nisms are put in place, particularly to avoid rent-seeking behav-
ior, natural resources should be a blessing for those countries.
The role of reforms to strengthen budget processes and in-
stitutions,  good  cost-benefit  analysis,  public  sector  manage-
ment, and evaluation are all crucial. Careful fiscal policy man-
agement  (for  example,  by  saving  an  adequate  portion  of 
resource revenues through a natural resource or wealth fund) 
can help address problems caused by real exchange rate appre-
ciation  (Dutch  disease,  see  Brahmbhatt,  Canuto,  and 
Vostroknutova [2010]) and commodity revenue volatility.
Conclusion 
The view taken here says, yes, there is a way for a switchover to 
occur, where developing economies as a whole can take on a 
greater role as a global locomotive and move global growth for-
ward, offsetting the forces moving toward a negative recoupling 
to slower growth in advanced countries. Successfully navigating 
the switchover will depend upon the domestic policies and re-
forms pursued in the developing countries.   
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Notes
1. A broad landscape of those policies and reforms can be found in Canuto 
and Giugale (2010).
2. Group of 20 (G-20): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the 
European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
3. Group of 7 (G-7) countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.
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